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In this paper we use the concept of social capital to outline a distinctive approach to 
understanding the interplay between management control systems and the 
development of social connections in and between organisations. Social capital 
provides a comprehensive framework for examining the nature of social connections 
through its focus on both structural networks (bridging) and interpersonal 
relationships that predispose individuals towards mutually beneficial collective action 
(bonding).  In doing so, social capital provides a means of considering how 
individuals react to management control systems in terms of the social ties that exist 
both within the organization and external to the organization.  Using a case study of a 
non-government organization, we show how social capital is implicated in efforts to 
attract economic capital and cultural capital. We demonstrate how elements of a 
management control system can either enhance or inhibit the bonding and bridging 
dimensions of social capital with potential consequences on both economic and 
cultural capital. We highlight the mixed and sometimes contradictory effects of 
management control systems on social capital, and provide a powerful illustration of 
the role of management control systems in brokering alliances and bridging structural 
holes. 
 




Social capital and management control systems: a study of a non-government 
organization 
Non-government organizations (NGOs) have a central role in delivering 
welfare services.  NGOs rely on developing social connections to draw together those 
in need with service providers and suppliers of welfare funding. This raises issues of 
how social connectedness can help organizations, such as NGOs, to deliver their 
services, and, consequently, has encouraged researchers to examine social 
infrastructures that facilitate individual and collective action of many kinds (Coleman, 
1990; Foley & Edwards, 1999).  Across a broad range of disciplines, the study of 
social connectedness has been facilitated by examining the phenomenon of social 
capital. Adler and Kwon (2002, p. 17) note “A growing number of sociologists, 
political scientists, and economists have invoked the concept of social capital in the 
search for answers to a broadening range of questions being confronted in their own 
fields.”  On this basis, we explore how social capital may contribute to knowledge in 
the area of management control systems (MCS) and how it may affect the 
management of NGOs.   
In this study our particular interest is in NGOs that provide welfare services to 
the community within the institutional space termed ‘civil society’.1  Providing 
welfare involves NGOs developing an identity to deliver humanitarian services and to 
attract economic capital to fund operations.  At times these two functions can be in 
tension. Social capital has a potential role in delivering services and attracting 
resources, and in managing the tension between the two.  Also, MCS are used both to 
                                                 
1 While ‘civil society’ has been defined in numerous ways, the term is generally taken to mean a realm 
or space where there are a set of organizational actors who are not part of the household, the market, or 
the state (Lewis, 2007, p. 54).  Lewis & Madon (2004, p. 120) define civil society as “…an institutional 
space between state, market, and household in which citizens could form associations, organize public 
action, and represent their interests and aspirations.” 
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assist in attracting economic capital and in delivering welfare services. Our study is 
concerned with understanding the interrelationship between MCS and social capital. 
Specifically, we examine how the combination of MCS and social capital can be 
either more, or less, effective in helping NGOs maintain their identity and capabilities 
to deliver services, while gaining funding. 
We draw on the work of Bourdieu (1986) and Oakes et al. (1998) in 
elaborating on the inherent tension facing NGOs as they struggle to balance the desire 
to maintain their core values and work processes based on humanitarian ideals (their 
cultural capital) with the need to attract sufficient economic capital.  To help 
understand how social capital is used by NGOs to deliver effective welfare services, 
we also draw on a stream of social capital research that focuses on the mechanisms 
that can strengthen the integration of agents to best effect co-ordinated actions, and 
examines how social capital can create consensus and sustain the stable development 
of society (Putnam, 1993; Coleman, 1990), as well as provide advantages for 
organizations (Krackhardt & Hanson, 1993; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997) and 
individuals (Gabbay & Zuckerman, 1998; Burt, 1992). From this literature we use the 
concept of structural bridging to analyse networks of social ties, and relational 
bonding to examine how individuals are predisposed towards mutually beneficial 
collective action.  Identifying these distinct dimensions helps isolate different 
advantages (and disadvantages) that can be derived from social capital (Gittell & 
Vidal, 1998), particularly related to information, power and solidarity (Adler & 
Kwon, 2002).  
In overview, examining how organizations seek to develop economic and 
cultural capital allows us to identify what is at stake as NGOs respond to pressure to 
be more efficient and effective. Although attempts to attract economic capital may 
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destroy cultural capital (Oakes et al., 1998), some research suggests that bonding and 
bridging can play a role in attracting economic capital while preserving cultural 
capital, although this is by no means assured (Adler & Kwon, 2002).  We argue that 
MCS have potential effects on bonding and bridging, both positive and negative.  
Consequently, important insights into the generation of economic and cultural capital 
can be gained by considering how MCS are implicated in the processes of bonding 
and bridging social capital.     
From a MCS perspective, considering social capital helps to understand how 
combinations of controls can have complementary or conflicting effects which may 
influence organizational outcomes.  Typically, formal controls are an important facet 
of MCS and help to maintain financial viability and develop efficient and effective 
work processes.2  The MCS literature has also shown that employing more flexible, 
organic controls can help maintain employee commitment and a sense of innovation, 
and that MCS may be most effective when formal and organic controls operate in 
combination (Davila et al., 2009).  By focusing on social capital, specifically the 
social ties involved in bonding and bridging, we are able to enrich understanding of 
the processes whereby formal and organic controls, and their combination, have their 
effects.   Thus, social capital is important as it allows us to consider how different 
aspects of MCS can have effects on how individuals react, not only within the 
organization but also external to the organization.     
To summarize, our study is one of the first to analyse the use of MCS in 
NGOs and thus responds to the call for research into issues of management and 
                                                 
2 To classify formal controls we draw on Simons’ (1995) levers of control (LOC) framework that 
identifies belief and boundary systems, and diagnostic and interactive control systems. We also 
consider the concepts of enabling and coercive controls to show how effective controls must have 
sufficient information and means of engagement to enable employees to address their areas of 
operation (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004).  We use these frameworks, separately and in combination, to 
help elaborate on how MCS can help or hinder the development of social capital.   
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management control in these types of organizations (Hopwood, 2005; Lewis, 2003; 
Ebrahim, 2003).  Specifically, we explore how the connection between MCS and 
social capital can potentially enhance or damage an NGO’s ability to manage the 
tension between attracting sufficient economic capital while sustaining cultural 
capital. Within this context, the study contributes to understanding the role of MCS in 
several ways.    
1. The study identifies how formal MCS have mixed effects on social capital. 
Formal controls adopted to attract and maintain economic capital can damage internal 
bonding with potential negative effects on service delivery, but enhance an NGO’s 
prospects to develop bridging social capital to attract economic capital while 
preserving cultural capital.  
2. Our study highlights the potential contradictory effects on social capital from 
the use of belief systems to develop and reinforce values. We show how active use of 
belief systems helps to manage and maintain employees’ identification with core 
values and thus develop strong bonding within organizations; yet such strong bonding 
leads to an inward focus and inhibits openness to developing bridging with other 
organizations.  
3.  We provide a powerful illustration of the role of MCS in brokering alliances 
and bridging structural holes. We elaborate on how an NGO can promote the 
preservation of its cultural capital when developing alliances by bridging structural 
holes, and show how formal MCS support this process by demonstrating and 
legitimizing the capabilities of the NGO to others in the alliance.  
4. We draw attention to difficulties in introducing formal controls where more 
informal, organic processes are the customary form of control.  We suggest that the 
‘interactive use’ of formal controls can be compatible with customary organic 
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processes if they have enabling characteristics. In this way formal controls may assist 
in developing internal bonding social capital.   
 The remainder of the paper is structured in three sections. The first section 
presents a review of relevant literature. The second section outlines our field study 
including discussion of our method and presentation and discussion of the results.  In 
the third and final section we present conclusions and limitations of the study. 
 
Literature review 
 We commence the literature review by considering the extent to which social 
capital has been examined in management control systems research.  Next we identify 
how Bourdieu (1986) conceived of social capital as combining with economic and 
cultural capital to provide entities with advantage. We show how economic and 
cultural can be in tension and how social capital can potentially resolve this tension.  
Following are sections that consider the properties and outcomes of social capital, and 
the way in which management control systems may be linked to social capital.  
Finally, we discuss the institutional context within which our study is positioned to 
show how NGOs face a setting in which there is increased pressure from government 
to demand accountability in the public sector, including NGOs, by way of the 
application of formal accounting systems. 
 
Social capital and prior management control systems research 
There are relatively few prior studies on the role of MCS in the development 
of social capital at the organizational level.3  However, themes relevant to the concept 
                                                 
3 Jacobs & Kemp (2002) found that among Bangladeshi small traders, the absence of accounting could 
be explained by the presence of social capital. Awio et al. (2007) found that in Uganda, community-led 
initiatives had the potential to enhance social capital and lead to improved accountability and social 
outcomes. 
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of social capital have been explored in research on inter-organizational relationships. 
One line of research has focused on how social networks can be structured to facilitate 
coordination, typically between an organization and its suppliers. The structuring of 
networks is relevant to social capital (see Mouritsen & Hansen [2006] and Håkansson 
& Lind [2007] for overviews of the role of MCS within enterprise networks). Other 
research has examined how relationships between an organization and important 
outside parties are influenced by accounting controls and social processes involving 
high levels of trust (Håkansson & Lind, 2007).  
While the MCS literature has investigated how inter-organizational 
relationships can involve structures of networks and informal, trust-based controls, 
these studies are based, in the main, on dyadic relationships between organizations 
and a key constituent, such as suppliers. This potentially limits consideration of the 
totality of relationships and network connections that relate to the development of 
social capital. There are only a small number of accounting studies that have 
examined how organizations interrelate within the broader network of entities with 
which they interact (see, for example, Tomkins [2001], Mouritsen & Thrane [2006] 
and Chua & Mahama [2007]). While prior MCS research into networks has not 
explicitly examined social capital, Mouritsen & Thrane (2006, p. 245) acknowledge a 
potential role: “it is also possible to study networks through social capital. Here 
networks are not in principle flat structures but ones structured by social capital. 
Social capital positions actors in social structures or relations and determines the 
actor’s life-chances (Coleman, 1988; 1990).”  This indicates a potentially important 
role for social capital in developing understanding of how social ties deliver benefits 
within network relationships and how MCS are implicated in these processes. 
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Social capital within Bourdieu’s concept of capitals 
Bourdieu (1986, 1993, 1998) considers how social connections can be used to 
gain individual advantage.  He identifies economic, cultural and social forms of 
capital, control over which helps entities maintain a position in the status hierarchy of 
society and to exercise and resist domination in social relations.4  Bourdieu’s concern 
with capitals is to help explain the reproduction of social inequality and the 
maintenance of capitalist order through the accumulation of various capitals. 
However, economic and social capitals can readily be identified, more generally, as 
attributes of organizations. Cultural capital can also be identified at the organizational 
level, as the ‘knowledge, practices, and goods’ that are consecrated as rare and 
desirable by organizations and that play a role in their social reproduction (Rubtsova 
& Dowd, 2004).5  Importantly, it has been argued that cultural capital can be 
employed by organizations for status attainment (Lamont & Lareau, 1988).    
In our study, economic and cultural capitals are important to defining positions 
and possibilities for various NGOs in society. Social capital is important as it enables 
organizations to build cultural capital and attract economic capital. Symbolic capital, 
as part of social capital, provides the basis for social position in a given society and is 
based on intersubjective reflections; it is in the ‘eyes of the others’. The power to 
                                                 
4 Economic capital involves stocks of assets either physical or intangible, property, cash, shares and the 
like. Cultural capital involves three aspects. The first of these is habitus which is a lasting, generalized 
and transposable disposition to act in conformity with a (quasi) systematic view of the world and 
human existence (Bourdieu, 1987:126).  It can involve deeply ingrained aspects such as race, ethnicity, 
gender that defines a person’s character and way of thinking.  The second is objectivization as in 
cultural articles (e.g. works of art), and the third, cultural institutions (e.g. certificates, diplomas).  
Social capital is seen to have two dimensions. First, it involves group membership and social networks 
such as voluntary associations, trade unions, political parties and the like.  Second, it involves symbolic 
capital that provides differences between groups or classes that provides symbolic recognition and 
distinction.  
5    Rubtsova & Dowd (2004) claim that Bourdieu¹s cultural capital can be extended to the 
organizational level. At this level, organizations can develop homogenous schemes of appreciation and 
action based on the 
production of specialized cultural knowledge and practices. Such knowledge and practices are valuable 
and distinctive and can therefore provide advantages and access to resources. 
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influence what constitutes cultural capital within a specific field is derived from 
symbolic capital.   
The NGO sector can be seen as distinctive in that there has traditionally been 
an ethos of a ‘sacrifice of selfish interests’, a belief in a legitimate way of operating to 
achieve common social ends, even if this occurs in situations where different NGOs 
may have different degrees of recognition, power and influence (Lewis, 2007).  Many 
NGOs see economic capital as a means to develop cultural capital, unlike more 
commercially-based organizations that employ cultural capital to maximize economic 
capital.6  This is not to say that individual NGOs are not selfishly interested in their 
continued existence and prosperity. Clearly, there is competition for resources and 
often client groups.  However, because the driving forces for NGOs typically involve 
a social rather than a profit mission, there tends to be more engagement in 
collaborative effort to achieve common social outcomes. Also, there is a more subtle 
balance between the use of power derived from the possession of cultural, economic 
and social capital for individual advantage and the use of these capitals to advance 
overall social welfare. 
The tension between cultural and economic capital in NGOs and the way in 
which cultural capital can be eroded by the dominance of economic capital, facilitated 
by accounting systems, is illustrated in a study by Oakes et al. (1998).  In Oakes et al. 
(1998), formal planning and accounting systems, imposed by outsiders, were used to 
shift the focus away from cultural capital, based on historic and authentic ideals, to a 
much greater concern with economic capital. Using Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic 
                                                 
6 While the basic conviction of many NGOs is to place cultural capital before economic capital, NGOs 
are not homogenous in this respect.  There is a broad range of NGOs operating internationally and 
within countries, providing variation in scale, operations, fundamental ethos and beliefs.  This 
generates variation in the emphasis and orientation towards cultural and economic capital.  However, 
the tension between cultural and economic capital remains common to most NGOs, although how they 
are traded-off may well differ (Ebrahim, 2003).    
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violence, Oakes et al. (1998) showed how the planning systems had subtle, rather than 
explicit effects, whereby employees embraced the new ethos where economic capital 
became dominant, with the cost that the historically-based cultural capital lost much 
of its importance.  In this context, social capital provides a way of examining how 
NGOs can manage the potential tension between cultural and economic capital to suit 
their purposes. In particular, we explore how the connections between MCS and 
social capital can help an NGO to resist the potential for symbolic violence arising 
from pressures to be more attentive to economic capital. 
In the next sections we elaborate on the properties and outcomes of social 
capital, and then consider the way in which MCS and social capital may be connected. 
We conclude the literature review by noting the institutional background to our study 
where MCS are becoming increasingly important to NGOs as government funding 
agencies encourage them to embrace ideas of new public management. 
 
The properties of social capital 
Social capital relates to existing and emerging social infrastructures that 
facilitate individual and collective actions of many kinds (Foley & Edwards, 1999). In 
this study we consider social capital as a property of an organization, where individual 
and collective actions provide actual or potential benefits for organizations (Baker, 
1990; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Portes, 1998; Adler & Kwon, 2002).7  Social 
capital can substitute for other resources such as financial or human capital by 
                                                 
7 Social capital, as an organizational asset, is similar to the idea that intellectual capital is generated by 
the endeavours of individuals but resides at the organizational level (Sveiby, 1997).  Sveiby (1997, 
p.10) sees employee competence, internal structures and external structures as generating the intangible 
assets of an organization.  He notes it is impossible to conceive of an organization without people but 
as the people are voluntary members of an organization, their endeavours provide benefits for the 
organization.   
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providing strong network connections and social ties (Coleman, 1990), which is 
particularly important in the NGO context where financial capital can be limited.8    
Scholars seeking to relate social capital to the achievement of desired 
outcomes by the integration of agents to best effect co-ordinated actions have 
elaborated the concept of social capital as having different facets, aspects and 
dimensions (Coleman, 1990; Schiff, 1992; Fukuyama, 1995; Brehm & Rahn, 1997). 
Consistent with a large body of research on social capital, we distinguish between 
bridging as a structural dimension of social capital, and bonding as a relational 
dimension of social capital (e.g., Granovetter, 1992; Gittell & Vidal, 1998; Nahapiet 
& Ghoshal, 1998; Woolcock, 1998; Putnam, 2000; Adler & Kwon, 2002).  
The bridging and bonding dimensions of social capital help recognise that 
specific opportunities can arise from establishing networks of social ties between 
organizations, and that these networks can be effected by nurturing motivation within 
(and between) organizations through bonding (Lesser, 2000). By drawing on literature 
that examines the bridging and bonding dimensions of social capital and their 
potential outcomes (e.g. information, power and solidarity), we can focus on how 
MCS may enhance or damage social capital.  
In overview, the bridging dimension of social capital concerns the quantum of 
ties and the structure of the network of the relations as a whole. Bonding refers to the 
quality of social ties in terms of the extent to which values are shared. While it is 
common to consider bonding as it exists within organizations (Adler & Kwon, 2002), 
it is also apparent that bonding can develop between organizations (Nahapiet & 
                                                 
8 Other non-physical assets have also been identified in accounting research as providing value. For 
example, intellectual capital is the knowledge and knowing capability of an organization that provide a 
source of value (Mouritsen, Larsen & Bukh, 2001). Human and social capital are sometimes confused.  
Human capital is the stock of skills and knowledge embodied in the ability to perform work so as to 
produce economic value (Widener, 2004). It is the skills and knowledge gained by a worker through 
education and experience. On the other hand, social capital provides value through the benefits that can 
be derived from both bonding and bridging (Adler & Kwon, 2002).    
 12 
Ghoshal, 1998).9 Table 1 elaborates on the properties of the bridging and bonding 
dimensions of social capital. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Outcomes of social capital  
Adler & Kwon (2002) note that organizational investments in social capital 
need to be guided by understanding the meaning of bridging and bonding and the 
different potential benefits and disadvantages from these dimensions. While we 
examine the possible influences of each dimension of social capital, we note that these 
dimensions act in combination, with bonding involving common norms and 
associability, and that action based on these values is carried out collectively through 
structural networks (Leana & Van Buren, 1999).   
Table 1 outlines the potential beneficial outcomes and disadvantages of both 
bonding and bridging social capital. In summary, prior research indicates that the 
potential benefits of social capital include: greater access to and more sharing of 
quality information through bridging between networks (Burt, 1997; Hansen, 1999); 
increased power and authority, particularly when connecting parties in sparse (rather 
than dense) networks (Granovetter, 1973; 1983); and greater solidarity and 
cooperation through the sharing of social norms and beliefs (Adler & Kwon, 2002; 
Ouchi, 1980). While solidarity is most often related to social capital within 
                                                 
9 In our work we are interested in how bonding and bridging are exercised to achieve close 
interpersonal relationships and networks of value to the organization. This is somewhat analogous to 
the difference between the content of social capital and the processes involved in its generation (see 
Adam & Ronĉevič, 2003, pp. 158-160, 164-167 for a discussion of the difference between types and 
functions of social capital).  While the processes to effect social capital may be seen as an antecedent to 
the actual content of social capital, understanding the content is necessary to assess the evolving nature 
of the construct. In this sense process affects content and content affects process (Chenhall, 2005).  
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organizations, it may encourage organizational citizenship which spills over to 
external networks (Granovetter, 1983; Putnam, 1993).10  
The disadvantages of social capital, however, may outweigh these benefits 
(Portes & Landolt, 1996; Gabbay & Leenders, 1999; Leana & Van Buren, 1999). The 
potential disadvantages of social capital include: its costs of development and 
maintenance, an inward focus leading to parochialism and inertia (Powell & Smith-
Doerr 1994; Uzzi, 1997; Gargiulo & Bernassi, 1999), which may be overcome by 
using information and knowledge from networks outside the organization 
(Granovetter, 1983; Burt, 2002); and collective rivalry of network partners against 
each other, with each pursuing their own special interests at the expense of the 
broader network (Foley & Edwards, 1996; Gabbay & Zuckerman, 1998). As Adler & 
Kwon (2002, p. 31) note: ‘There is no invisible hand that assures that the use of social 
capital resources in competition among actors will generate an optimal outcome for 
the broader aggregate’.    
 
Linking MCS to social capital 
While our investigation was not constrained by a focus on any particular MCS 
framework, it is apparent from the MCS literature that the notion of formal and 
                                                 
10 An issue related to solidarity is the relationship between social capital and trust. For some 
commentators social capital is a means whereby trust can be developed to enhance solidarity 
(Krackhardt & Hanson, 1993). However, the role of trust can be ambiguous and can obfuscate the 
potential benefits of social capital on solidarity. Free (2008) notes that trust is not the only antecedent 
to cooperation.  Certainly within the social capital literature solidarity from bonding can involve many 
sources including motivation derived from a willingness to define and enact collective goals (Leana & 
Van Buren, 1999), and generalized reciprocity. There is also the danger of overrating the benefits of 
trust.  Free (2008) notes that power can be disguised behind a facade of trust, and then used to promote 
vested interests and exploit weaker partners. He notes the idea of ‘cheap talk’ that concerns 
exaggerating the benefits of trust with the intent to use trust as a strategic resource and to use this 
opportunistically.  Free (2008, p. 649) prefers to define trust in terms of ‘accommodative intentions’, 
‘reliability’ and ‘commitment’. This idea seems consistent with generalized reciprocity and avoids the 
use of trust as a discursive resource. For these reasons we do not emphasize the role of trust in the 
study of social capital.  
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informal controls provides a basis to elaborate on classifications of controls 
(Hopwood, 1972; Merchant, 1981; Simons, 1995; Chenhall & Morris, 1995; Ahrens 
& Chapman, 2004).   Combining formal and informal controls has been  important in 
understanding how MCS can be designed and implemented and their effects on 
organizational outcomes (Simons, 1995; Chenhall & Morris, 1995; Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2004)11,  including, in our study, the potential effects of MCS on the study 
of social capital.  
We first discuss the meaning of three taxonomies of MCS that have elaborated 
on both formal and informal aspects of controls.  These are organic and formal 
controls (Chenhall & Morris, 1995), the levers of control framework (Simons, 1995), 
and enabling and coercive controls (Adler & Borys, 1996; Ahrens & Chapman, 2004).  
Table 2 provides a summary of the links to and possible tensions between the controls 
and social capital. We use these classification schemes, separately and in 
combination, to examine the connections between MCS and social capital.  
Formal controls have been distinguished from informal or organic controls in 
the organizational (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) and 
accounting literatures (Chenhall & Morris, 1995; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). 
Organic controls are based on informal processes, a free flow of information 
throughout the organization, and flexibility to encourage adaptive decision making 
and to foster interactions within the organization (Simons, 1995; Chenhall & Morris, 
1995; Davila et al., 2009). In contrast, formal controls are deliberately articulated 
practices and include formal planning systems such as budgets and control 
mechanisms such as variance analysis against standard costs (Simons, 1995; Davila et 
al, 2009). Although organic controls have been the customary form of controls in 
                                                 
11  As discussed in this section, we distinguish formal controls as deliberately articulated practices that 
relate to  formal planning and control  from  organic controls that relate to informal processes, loose 
structures and open communication (Chenhall & Morris, 1995).   
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NGOs, formal controls have been introduced to provide a more business-like 
approach to acquiring and managing resources (Lewis, 2007). 
Simons (1995) elaborates on aspects of formal controls within his levers of 
control framework.  He identifies belief and boundary systems which can be used to 
articulate and advertise the aims of the organization. MCS based on formal controls 
are divided into diagnostic and interactive control systems.  Diagnostic control 
systems are formal practices that measure and monitor outcomes and guide corrective 
action, and are used as levers in implementing intended strategy (p. 63) and providing 
guidance to employees to work towards agreed goals (p. 70).12  In Simons’ (1995) 
work, the role of interactive control systems occupies a higher level of attention in 
terms of how they are used. Simons distinguishes interactive control systems as the 
way managers use formal practices to involve themselves regularly and personally in 
the decision activities of subordinates by way of face to face meetings (p. 95). 
Additionally, the formal practices are used to motivate information gathering outside 
routine channels to help identify strategic uncertainties and emerging strategies (p. 
96).   
Notwithstanding a more interactive use of formal controls, these can be 
embedded within a bureaucratic approach to control. Adler & Borys (1996) elaborate 
on how formal controls positioned with bureaucratic structures can assist in providing 
more flexible adaptive control cultures, consistent with organic controls, when they 
are designed and implemented with enabling rather than coercive capabilities. Ahrens 
& Chapman (2004) employed the notions of enabling and coercive controls to show 
                                                 
12 Diagnostic use of formal controls is a somewhat elaborated idea of Simons’ original diagnostic 
control systems that we employ in our study as it assists in understanding the processes involved in 
employing MCS practices at the operational level.  Particularly, we investigate how diagnostic use of 
formal controls involves communicating and educating employees about proposed goals and targets, 
assessing how operations are performing against plans (financial and non-financial), and in motivating 
deliberation at the operational level on how variances may be addressed.   
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how MCS that had enabling features helped put employees in a restaurant chain into a 
position whereby they could deal directly with the contingencies of their work 
situation.  To help achieve this, the design characteristics of the MCS were that they 
enabled employees to repair local situations, and that they had internal transparency, 
global transparency, and flexibility. We see the taxonomies of the levers of control 
and enabling and coercive controls as complementary as Adler & Borys (1996) 
elaborate on how formal controls (such as interactive control systems) positioned 
within bureaucratic structures can assist in providing more flexible and adaptive 
controls in cultures that may be consistent with organic controls, but only when they 
are designed and implemented with enabling capabilities.   
In Table 2 we describe and distinguish the three taxonomies of MCS, each 
rooted in the distinction between relative formality and informality. We relate these 
taxonomies to the context of NGOs, indicate potential links to social capital and 
highlight possible tensions between control elements as they concern the development 
of social capital.  These three taxonomies illuminate how the application of MCS can 
help or hinder the development of social capital. While we have identified the 
separate potential effects of various aspects of management controls, we acknowledge 
that different controls can operate collectively (Widener, 2007).   
 
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 Institutional context: The drive for new public management and the NGO 
The pressure to adopt MCS in the public sector has in many Western 
countries, including Australia, been embraced within ideas of ‘new public 
management’ (NPM).  This approach was introduced by the State governments of 
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Australia as part of reform programs that accompanied changes in government in the 
1990s. Other aspects of the reforms included a reduction in the budgetary 
requirements, downsizing the public services, privatizing the government operations 
and deregulating private economic enterprises (Aucoin, 1990). NPM aims to move 
public sector organizations towards a managerialist philosophy with implicit values of 
economic rationalism (Guthrie, Olson & Humphrey, 1999; Jones, Guthrie & Steane, 
2001). It has been claimed this may damage the long-term sustainability of public-
sector organizations (Guthrie, Cuganesan & Boedker, 2005).   
The Australian NGO sector is heavily reliant on government funding for its 
continued operations, and thus is subject to these government pressures for increased 
accountability and formal reporting. In the State in which our study is located, the 
implementation of NPM reforms and the transition towards managerialist models 
invoked the use of more formal control systems, including a shift towards the 
application of formal accounting and reporting techniques (Guthrie, Carlin & 
Yongvanich, 2004). With the advent of NPM, professionals and managers in social 
welfare have been subjected to quantitative performance indicators, often expressed in 
accounting terms (English, Guthrie & Parker, 2005). This has introduced practices 
contrary to customary approaches in social welfare departments where qualitative 
assessment had been the norm.13  
 Within this context, our paper is complementary and contributes to the 
literature that has examined resistance from public sector employees (professionals) to 
the introduction of financial controls (bureaucratic approaches) that is part of the push 
                                                 
13 Changes in NGOs from traditional to business-like values have resonance to studies of cultural 
change. Several studies have shown the influence of accounting to help effect this change in culture 
(Ezzamel & Bourn, 1990; Dent, 1991; Blomgren, 2003; Kurunmäki, 2004; Mueller & Carter, 2007). 
What these studies don’t explicitly consider is the “spillover’ effect of these changes in culture to 
relationships external to the organization.  Our case adds to these insights by demonstrating how 
management controls influence reactions to cultural change, within the organization and externally.  
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for NPM (Dent & Whitehead, 2002).  We explore how NGOs react to attempts to 
introduce the new logic of financial controls, and show how social capital is central to 
understanding the responses of NGOs. By studying social capital much can be learned 
about the benefits and pitfalls to the operations of NGOs of using the new financial 
logic.14 
 
Design and Research Method 
Research site selection 
 We selected an NGO as our research site due to the importance of social capital 
to such organizations (Lewis, 2007), thus providing an appropriate setting to explore the 
dynamics of the relationship between social capital and MCS. The field study was 
undertaken within Carewell, a welfare agency founded in 1977 that operates in a major 
Australian city.15 The focus of our empirical analysis is the Tennant Centre, the largest 
and most established of Carewell’s divisions. The field research was conducted over a 
12-month period from July 2007 to June 2008.  Over the 12 months, we conducted 16 
in-depth interviews with 12 key personnel spanning across all levels of the 
organizational structure, with further details provided in Table 3. Additionally, we had 
regular contact with Tennant’s manager and administrative officer and more focused 
follow-up discussions with Carewell’s CEO and the Business Director.16  Given the 
                                                 
14 The pressure from government to coerce NGOs to adopt MCS as part of NPM has also been 
addressed within institutional theory (see for example, DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Covaleski & 
Dirsmith, 1988; Covaleski, Dirsmith, & Michelman, 1993). Critiques of institutional theory propose 
that while accounting practices may be adopted for legitimization they may also assist managers in 
reacting strategically to select, purposefully, management systems to achieve their organization’s goals 
(Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995). Moreover, it can be argued that institutional 
theory does not fully capture the nature of social ties in organizations’ responses to institutional forces. 
Social capital enriches institutional theory by explicitly considering the nature of these ties. 
15 The identities of individuals within the organization, and of the organization itself, have been disguised 
to preserve anonymity in accordance with our agreement with the organization.   
16 On average over the twelve month period we had contact with the Tennant administrator fortnightly, 
the Tennant manager bi-monthly, and Carewell staff monthly. This involved less formal unscripted 
interactions, usually involving face-to-face contact but in some instances telephone conversations. 
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relatively small size of the organization, this provided the opportunity to gain a wide 
cross-section of opinion at both managerial and operational levels. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
 While interviews were relatively unstructured, an initial interview protocol was 
developed to ensure that evidence would be collected on participants’ views related to 
their values, the work situation both within the organization and with others external to 
the entity, and their experiences and opinions on the MCS.  Interviewees were allowed 
to freely explore issues that they believed were important. Interviews were digitally-
recorded and transcribed. Where this was not permitted we took detailed notes during 
the interview that we wrote up on the same day. Each formal interview ran for 
approximately 75 minutes, although informal follow-up conversations involved many 
more hours of contact. At least two researchers were present at all interviews to 
enhance data reliability and to maintain continuity with our contacts at the research 
sites.  It is claimed that multiple investigators improve the creative potential of the 
study and build confidence in the findings (Pettigrew, 1988).     
 We supplemented data from interviews and informal conversations with e-mail 
correspondence and extensive archival records (including access to internal MCS 
documents covering budgets, performance measurement documents, reports related to 
program performance evaluation, program management systems, Carewell’s code of 
conduct and mission statements, publicity material, and government reporting 
requirements). Additionally, we examined publicly-available data including information 
from the organization’s website, other promotional material and evidence from 
secondary sources including newspaper articles and other media information.  
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 During our visits to the organization we were able to directly observe facilities, 
working conditions and, to a limited extent, the way in which those interviewed 
conducted their work.  Due to the sensitive nature of Tennant’s work with clients and 
ethics related to confidentiality, our research was constrained to passive observation. 
However, we were involved in informal interactions with employees during their breaks 
and leisure time where we were party to off-the-record nuances and general feelings 
about ongoing changes. Also, during our visits we often observed work-in-action as 
problems, emergencies and crises were presented for action.  Usually, observation of 
these events and discussion with key personnel after the events helped us understand the 
culture of work within the organization.     
 In an effort to provide an external perspective to our enquiry we contacted a 
number of other organizations, which included State Government Departments of 
Health and Justice, local health care agencies who had contact with Tennant, and other 
NGOs working in areas similar to Tennant. We also obtained information on Tennant’s 
reputation from six individuals who had been involved with alliance partners, 
particularly in the local health area. In addition, we spoke with individuals from locally-
based philanthropic associations, researchers on NGOs within a Centre for Health 
Economics, and others researching NGOs within several different university faculties.     
 Consistent with Ahrens & Chapman (2004) and Free (2007), we employed 
Eisenhardt’s (1989) methods to conduct case research.  This involved arranging the data 
chronologically and identifying common themes and unique insights and also areas of 
disagreement. We also used archival records, particularly mission statements, program 
documentation and internal MCS documents, to elaborate and refine our understanding 
of important issues that arose in interview discussions.  We then re-organized the 
original transcripts around key events and issues; and compared emerging findings from 
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our study with existing research.  Emerging findings and themes were noted, 
particularly for further discussion and clarification as part of our follow-up interviews 
with senior managers and a number of operational employees.  
 
Overview of the organization 
Carewell has approximately 120 staff located across three divisions (the 
Tennant Centre, Options, and Opportunities) which work to build a just society by 
advocating for social change and promoting the health and wellbeing of disadvantaged 
young people, families and communities. Figure 1 outlines Carewell’s organizational 
structure. The three divisions, Options, Opportunities and Tennant provide services to 
different client groups, while Carewell provides administrative services, strategic 
direction and manages funding. The Options division provides counselling services and 
other forms of social support to young people suffering from mental health and drug-
related issues. The Opportunities division is responsible for the operation of a long-term 
program for disadvantaged young people focused on skill development, education and 
secure employment.    
The focus of our empirical analysis is the Tennant Centre, the largest and most 
established of Carewell’s divisions. Tennant cares for people from disadvantaged 
backgrounds, many of whom have had dealings with the justice system or have been 
otherwise marginalized.  Its sponsoring organization is Carewell, which is affiliated 
with a large philanthropic organization. While Carewell is the central agency for the 
collection of funds, Tennant is also active in attracting funding for its programs.  
Tennant comprises 42 paid staff, including a manager, an administrative staff of four, 
five program co-ordinators, and 32 case workers. Tennant also interrelates with a wide 
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variety of service providers that offer employment opportunities, and housing, medical, 
psychological and social services. Operational decisions are delegated to Tennant.   
Examination of documents and discussions with accounting personnel and 
managers revealed that Tennant has its own work-based control system designed to plan 
and monitor client treatments, often being based on professional issues concerning 
social work and psychology. Budgets are developed at Carewell with an administrative 
employee possessing accounting skills located within Tennant. The financial accounting 
system allows costs to be traced to different segments of the organization and has the 
capacity to deal with fixed and variable costing. It is quite sophisticated but is not seen 
as user-friendly at the operational level. Tennant’s program manager and Carewell’s 
directors indicated that Tennant has a major role in developing strategic initiatives; 
however, financial concerns are dealt mainly by Carewell.  
Tennant’s external network comprises existing and potential clients, agencies 
that provide services, other welfare agencies with which Tennant is competitive for 
funding and new programs (some of these agencies become partners in joint programs), 
and government departments that are involved in managing the welfare and justice 
sectors and provide funding for new initiatives.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Case study findings 
 We organize the case findings around the major themes of our investigation.  
First, we use Bourdieu (1986) to help position our study of social capital and MCS at 
Tennant in a setting where there is increasing tension between efforts to preserve 
cultural capital while attracting and managing economic capital.  We then consider how 
formal controls both assisted and hindered developing social capital, using notions of 
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bonding and bridging, highlighting issues related to interactive use of formal controls 
and enabling characteristics. Next we identify the important role of belief systems in 
supporting bonding social capital, while at the same time limiting the development of 
bridging social capital. The final section shows how Tennant was able to use formal 
controls to assist in brokering alliances and bridging structural holes to help preserve its 
cultural capital. 
 
Emerging tensions between cultural and economic capital  
A primary concern underlying our study is the tension faced by NGOs as they 
attract economic capital while attempting to preserve their cultural capital. Tennant’s 
history and identity had provided it with strong cultural capital related to social 
welfare (Bourdieu, 1986). The building of this cultural capital was reinforced by 
employees’ beliefs in Tennant’s role and from a sense of common purpose based on 
the ideals of providing welfare services for marginalized people.  A Carewell manager 
explained: 
“The type of people who come to work here are interested in providing 
service to the community…pay levels in the sector are not 
high…employees dedicated to these ends are attracted to the 
organization …that’s what generates commitment.” 
 
Within the sector, Tennant was also perceived as an effective service provider and a 
leader in social welfare. While all participants in the study were proud of the high 
standards of professional service delivery, our discussions with managers of external 
agencies confirmed that Tennant’s work was regarded highly in its sector. As a 
consequence of these subjective reflections both within and outside the organization, 
Tennant’s symbolic capital was based on a perception of excellence in delivering 
social welfare.  Other forces related to managing resources efficiently, typically 
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derived from funding agencies and government, had not in the past occupied a 
dominant position. Tennant had not been open to ideas on accounting control to assist 
in the efficient use of resources as there had been no ‘division of the work of 
domination’, or any apparent tension between those preserving cultural ideals and 
those who might perpetuate objectives of economic capital (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992).    
In its current context, however, Tennant, like many NGOs, is faced with 
increased competition to attract economic capital to support its welfare programs.  In 
particular, the intersection of several features of Tennant’s operational environment has 
recently created increased tension between cultural and economic capital. These 
features are the drive for new public management (NPM), changes in funding 
arrangements, and the nature of service delivery in the welfare sector with government 
increasingly subcontracting welfare services to NGOs.  
Senior management at both Carewell and Tennant stressed that funding is an on-
going concern. Sources of funds are donations from the public, bequests, and primarily 
government support for specific programs often undertaken jointly with other agencies. 
Carewell’s directors explained that a unique source of funds has been a foundation from 
stakeholders linked to Carewell. These funds have been employed historically to cover 
shortfalls and act as a buffer to potential financial distress caused by budget overruns.  
However, in recent years, Carewell has instructed its divisions, including Tennant, that 
they can no longer rely on these funds to cover deficits, meaning that divisions are now 
struggling to find sufficient funds to ensure that all of their programs can continue.   
Tennant’s service delivery model involves connecting clients with other 
agencies that provide housing, employment, medical and social services.  Managing 
these connections is critical as no one agency can adequately meet all the needs 
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identified for program participants. Collaboration involves advocacy for Tennant’s 
clients and advising and educating other agencies in how best to provide services.  
Tennant’s manager noted that concentrated effort related to other agencies is 
important to ensure co-ordination and accessibility to services where resources are 
limited and participants are easily diverted.  Additionally, Tennant often works with 
other agencies to submit to government joint proposals for program funding.  One 
senior Carewell manager described the sector as follows: 
“Oh it's a pretty competitive sector.  So on the one level there's very much a 
‘let's work together' [ethos]; but on another level, the way government rolls 
out its funding causes competition with each other for scarce resources and 
dollars…You have some wins and losses and sometimes you're not quite sure 
what drove the decision being made and, you know, there's politics 
everywhere you go.  In most organizations in the sector we work in, it is very 
personality driven, they're very much about who knows who, what's the 
reputation of an organization - and you know a lot of organizations are 
smallish so people tend to know each other.  So I think there's a level of 
competition but a level of goodwill and they kind of sit in tension beside each 
other.”  
 
Additionally, interacting with government has become increasingly important 
as official agencies seek to identify key welfare agencies to deliver services.  
Government is attempting to develop co-ordinated programs and rationalize 
resources. Tennant’s manager noted favourable outcomes from these interactions: 
“Given our expertise in our sector we are in the process of negotiating 
with a government agency on how to improve the delivery of services by 
 rationalizing on the basis of community/region-based approach to care.  
 This will provide advantage to Tennant but will involve reorganization 
and possibly disadvantage some other agencies.” 
 
Within this environment, attracting economic resources requires Tennant to 
demonstrate to funding agencies and government its ability to deliver services 
effectively and efficiently.  In the NPM context, this has generated a need to employ 
planning systems related to operations, and control mechanisms to ensure that action is 
consistent with plans and that governance is maintained.  In the past, Tennant’s 
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continued existence had been dependent largely on developing its cultural capital, 
which had enabled it to establish a strong reputation and link its clients successfully 
with other agencies. Its survival now depends on developing and managing both 
cultural and economic capital.  As noted by Bourdieu (1986), these forms of capital 
may be in tension when efforts to attract economic capital are pursued in ways that 
diminish cultural capital.  
Resistance to symbolic violence at Tennant.  At Tennant we see echoes of the 
role of symbolic violence exerted by economic capital over cultural capital, in 
Bourdieu’s terms (Oakes et al. 1998). However, arguably, at Tennant, we observe a 
situation of resistance to the potential circuitous incursion of symbolic violence. 
Symbolic capital was squarely associated with the social welfare values that defined 
Tennant’s cultural capital and close bonding was part of this orientation.  Tennant 
does not see itself in the business of earning a monetary return. The aim is to generate 
adequate economic capital to maintain cultural capital.  We observed Tennant using 
cultural capital to support their submissions for funding, for example, emphasizing its 
dedication to humanitarian values to establish a dominant position in the bidding 
process for government contracts.  In this way, Tennant used its cultural capital to 
attract economic capital, but in a balanced way whereby its cultural capital would not 
be compromised. As such, when there is talk about trade-offs between cultural and 
economic capital, cultural capital wins out.  Importantly, when seeking funds or 
contracts, it is cultural capital that is promoted, albeit within a proposal that indicates 
necessary responsible outcomes and financial management.  
While welfare values are dominant at Tennant, inevitably economic concerns 
impact on Tennant’s ability to maintain its cultural capital.  While the dominant focus 
of cultural capital concerns values of delivering welfare services, not all deserving 
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causes can be serviced in situations of constrained funding.  Employing a rational 
approach to welfare delivery involves some form of formal or informal cost-benefit 
analysis to decide on which clients to service. This intrusion of economic rationality 
inevitably involves not undertaking some worthy but expensive causes.  If these 
‘causes’ to be neglected are part of the targeted welfare group, cultural capital can be 
damaged and the organization risks losing its identity.  Clearly, a solution is to 
develop internal values that are more embracing of economic concerns. This may 
convince Tennant’s employees that the long term social interests of Tennant, and 
likely their own work, will be preserved by managing more efficiently while 
delivering on core values. This may occur, however it remains a challenge and it is 
not clear that this will ever be entirely successful, particularly in NGOs (Kurunmäki, 
2009).   
 
The interplay between formal management control systems and social capital 
At Tennant the customary forms of control included informal meetings 
between case workers and co-ordinators, open channels of communication, ease of 
informal access to the Tennant manager, consensus and participative decision 
making, tolerance of mistakes and consequent learning and sharing of lessons, and 
sharing of information between employees, particularly over client treatments. These 
practices were not based on formal processes, but are more aptly described as organic 
decision and communication processes (Chenhall & Morris, 1995).   
These organic controls appeared to have been consistent with, and supportive 
of, bonding within Tennant. It is within this customary form of control that more 
formal controls were implemented. Our data indicate that formal program 
management systems were employed in ways that were not in conflict with these 
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organic controls. In this section we report on how program management systems 
were used interactively and the controls had enabling characteristics.  However, 
efforts to employ other formal controls such as budgets and performance 
measurement interactively were problematic and damaged bonding social capital, 
partly as they were employed in a coercive way. 
Program management systems. The program management system provides a 
particularly helpful illustration of how the interactive use of formal controls can be 
consistent with customary organic controls where they are employed in enabling 
ways.  Arguably, this enhanced the potential for the program management system to 
help internal bonding and external bridging social capital.  
Program management systems were part of operational management and were 
important in clarifying desired welfare outcomes and in sharing information about 
clients to improve treatment and administrative processes associated with these 
treatments. These systems involved both scheduled formal meetings but also 
impromptu gatherings and discussions, more consistent with the customary 
background organic processes at Tennant. The characteristics of these controls were 
consistent with an enabling approach.  The systems were highly transparent, flexible 
and provided details of interdependences between specific programs and other parts of 
Tennant’s operations. Case workers indicated that these systems were critical in 
clarifying and communicating Tennant’s purpose across the organization, in client 
selection and in monitoring client treatment. The information provided by the 
program management systems included confidential, privileged client information to 
be used only within the organization.  Access to this type of privileged information 
enhances bonding and feelings of solidarity (Fields, Copp & Kleinman, 2008, p. 168).  
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Our evidence suggests that these systems were well received. A Carewell director 
commented: 
“We use formal procedures for ‘assessment and engagement’ of 
clients…quantitative measures are used as part of case notes that are used to 
assess how individuals and teams are achieving planned treatment 
outcomes. These are seen as an effective part of operational employees’ 
work.” 
 
Furthermore, the program management system provided employees with 
opportunities to identify strategic uncertainties and discuss solutions.  For example, a 
case worker noted that discussions within a program management session identified 
the impact of operational policies on employment needs of clients and the unintended 
outcome of a need for more efficient transport. This motivated discussion of the 
strategic issues of how to optimally use existing transport (routing) and the relative 
benefits of a new vehicle.  Program management is particularly pertinent to 
generating bonding in NGOs where planning and monitoring of client treatments and 
behaviours match closely with the client’s wellbeing and even survival.  
In addition to enhancing internal bonding, program budgeting has potential to 
promote external bonding across networks with agencies that share common values. 
Sharing common values might be expected to lead to bonding between agencies and 
consequent outcomes of alliance solidarity and information sharing. We observed 
instances where individuals employed by different alliance partners had experienced 
close personal bonding based on professional experiences outside their respective 
organizations. However, this was not translated into inter-organizational bonding.  
While wanting to ensure organizational co-operation, some distance was 
maintained to reduce the chances of alliance partners pressuring Tennant to change 
their preferred way of delivering services. This could compromise Tennant’s cultural 
capital.  In plain terms, while alliance partners all share broad welfare goals, Tennant 
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did not want to get too close to, and bond with, its alliance partners. The advantages 
of the formality of the program management system and the quantification of 
program expectations were to bridging, rather than external bonding, by providing a 
means by which structural connections between alliance partners could be rendered 
more ‘objective’ and ‘trustworthy’ (Free, 2007, p. 5).  
While program management illustrated a reluctance to engage in external 
bonding, the systems were associated with bridging alliance contacts in ways to help 
preserve Tennant’s cultural capital.  Program management systems as applied to 
proposed new contracts provided a way that Tennant could use the veil of formality to 
identify and access potential partners and then broker alliances in ways that could 
promote Tennant’s specific core values and operational methods.  In bidding for a 
new contract, a program would be instigated with detailed information on Tennant’s 
credentials and expertise in providing service delivery, as well as time-lines, financial 
budgets, performance measures and the potential roles of selected partners.  This 
would form the basis for negotiations with potential partners and if the final project 
details were acceptable to Tennant it would then form the basis for a formal proposal 
to be submitted to funding agencies or government. Here we observed the way 
program management and bridging social capital worked in tandem to enhance 
Tennant’s power and authority in establishing alliances. We return to the use of 
formal MCS to assist Tennant develop alliances in ways to preserve its cultural capital 
later in the paper.   
Budgets and performance measurement. To attract funding and acquire 
government contracts Tennant recognizes that it must be perceived as capable of 
operating in a business-like manner, of being economically literate and competent.  
Budgets and performance measurement systems have been introduced recently in an 
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interactive way. This involved face-to-face interactions at formal meetings where it 
was intended to discuss plans, flag concerns and identify emerging issues related to 
both financial and operational issues. These initiatives have not been successful and 
had potential to seriously erode internal bonding social capital. 
As we have indicated, at Tennant, effectiveness in service delivery has been at 
the core of building and preserving cultural capital. Acquiring and managing 
economic capital, while not ignored, were secondary and did not occupy the attention 
of operational managers. During our study we observed that this was particularly 
apparent where, despite recent efforts, program co-ordinators had limited 
understanding of financial matters and the budget position. A Tennant employee 
noted:  
“People who are co-ordinators never see these financial statements…and yet 
they’re the ones that authorise the spending, so how do they know how 
much they can authorise?” 
 
A Tennant program co-ordinator commented: 
“At the moment I wouldn’t know what over budget is”. 
 
 In order to attract economic capital Tennant has attempted to promote an 
image of efficiency and cost consciousness among its employees. A Carewell director 
indicated that government’s desire for increased accountability has led Carewell to 
recognize a need to push financial accountability down to the co-ordinator level. It is 
here that we see evidence of a clash between pressures to be financially accountable 
and the belief that this distracts from the core activities of providing welfare services.  
In fact, apart from the program management system, formal reporting and 
management systems are generally viewed as an impediment to spending time and 
effort on clients. A Tennant co-ordinator noted: 
 32 
“A lot of the more stringent reporting-type stuff actually does very quickly 
feel irrelevant, or can do quite quickly. You can be sitting doing something 
you need to get to (e.g. reporting on budgets), but someone will come in 
quite drug-affected, throwing a chair around, and all of a sudden you step 
into another role, and, obviously if someone is feeling unsafe or something 
like that’s going on, you have to get to that as well.” 
 
While it is not uncommon to see such resistance in many organizations 
undergoing pressure to move from traditional to more business-like cultures, there 
was a view at Tennant that it was unrealistic to expect co-ordinators to have 
budget responsibility and to develop cost-consciousness. One Carewell staff 
member noted: 
“We cannot make accountants out of social workers.  That wouldn’t be fair 
to them…It depends on the individual.  Some of them are really into 
financial things and they actually know what they are talking about, and 
they know their costs, their expenditure, their funding, but some of them 
[would say], “I am a social worker. I look after Matt, and I look after John, 
and as long as I produce that, the rest I am not so interested in.” 
 
The potential damage to bonding from using budgets to increase financial 
accountability was evident in a confrontation between Carewell and Tennant.  Rather 
than form a basis for monitoring the financial performance of programs, providing 
budget information to program co-ordinators has led to a breakdown of bonding 
between Tennant and Carewell, with Tennant questioning Carewell’s commitment to 
its operations. Tennant’s manager argued that deficits reported for their programs 
would have been surpluses if cost allocations from Carewell were excluded.   
 A Tennant employee noted: 
“They’re [Carewell] starting to drive home the message that they are not 
going to keep accepting the deficit…I don’t know if they realise what a 
risky thing it is for them to do that, because immediately people are going to 
say the way we can balance it is not to give Carewell any money – they 
[Carewell] are on their way to endangering the golden goose.”  
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It is pertinent that the budget information did not include details that we 
would describe as enabling and thus more informed debate was inhibited. The 
budgets did not provide information that might have helped discussions on how 
tensions between Carewell and Tennant could be repaired. While there were face-to-
face interactions on budgets, the budgets did not have sufficient transparency to 
highlight ways that budget constraints affected operations. The broader picture of the 
local implications of budget cuts on programs or of the role of organization-wide 
overheads were not disclosed.  The controls were not flexible in decisions linking 
financial and operational issues.  It is possible that more attention to enabling features 
and processes would ensure that budgets contained more information and would 
engage employees more with the design and implementation of the controls. This 
could then be used for productive interactions and be more consistent with the 
customary organic controls.   
These findings provide a parallel with recent accounting research focusing on 
hybridization as organizations move from more professional modes to managerial 
approaches of doing business (see for example, Blomgren, 2003; Kurunmäki, 2004; 
2009; Jacobs, 2005: Mueller & Carter, 2007). For example, Kurunmäki (2004) found 
evidence that faced with NPM reforms in Finland, doctors sought to embrace 
management accounting concepts, in a sense becoming “hybridized”.  In contrast, we 
saw little evidence of hybridization at Carewell, with program co-ordinators, in 
general, being unwilling to embrace management accounting issues.  
Notwithstanding these negative attitudes to financial controls at Tennant, it 
can be argued that inevitably the organization’s survival will depend on gaining a 
balance between work processes that can deliver effectively on social welfare and the 
economic resources to sustain this. Efforts to ensure the alignment of employee and 
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organizational values include recruitment, socializing, training, retrenchment and 
other methods of dismissal of unsuited individuals.  In the NGO sector, recruitment is 
not easy with salaries at the bottom end of the social worker, health care and 
administrative ranges. Also, selection is made even more difficult as the NGO will not 
employ staff who do not present with values consistent with the core ideals of social 
justice.  The pool of potentially ‘ideal’ employees with a breadth of operational and 
financial skills is thin and there is reluctance to remove individuals competent at 
social work but who find it difficult to accommodate financial management practices.  
Simons (1995, p. 134) notes that, typically, it is neither feasible nor desirable to 
replace the existing workforce; rather, he suggests, that belief systems can be used to 
create emerging agendas.   
  
The effects of belief systems on bonding and bridging social capital  
The application of formal financial control practices to enable Tennant to 
attract and manage economic capital had unintended effects of inhibiting bonding, 
threatening the cultural capital which has been crucial to ensuring Tennant’s survival. 
This is an example of how the content of a MCS negatively affects bonding because 
employees lacked identification with the aims underscoring the new formal systems.  
The issue of ensuring that particular values of the NGO can be sustained is not 
restricted to addressing incompatibilities between financial and service delivery 
concerns. More generally, NGOs face situations where core values related to welfare 
service delivery can be potentially compromised from sources both within and outside 
the NGO. This raises the general issue of how MCS can be employed to reinforce 
adherence to core organizational values.  
Simons’ (1995) belief and boundary systems have been articulated as a way of 
using formal controls to clarify and communicate values.  Like many other 
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organizations, Tennant employed belief systems to communicate core values to 
potential employees during recruitment, and to reinforce these values to existing 
employees and to others outside the organization. This involved an array of emblems 
including formal documents and posters, photographs, statues and paintings of 
Tennant’s patron in the main offices.  At Tennant, the mission statement is displayed 
and publicized widely: 
“The Tennant Centre aims to deliver quality programs in a manner that reflects 
the social justice principles of participation, equity, access and respect for 
individuals who seek the services of the Centre. The Agency and its staff are 
committed to the underlying value and dignity of every human life.” 
 
Some argue that belief systems can add most value when used actively to 
influence employee behaviour in specific situations (Dowling, 2001; Mullane, 2002; 
Mundy, 2009). We observed belief systems in action to help manage a potential 
dilemma common within welfare agencies.  This involves an inherent tension between 
a case worker’s values and those of the organization.  In NGOs that deliver welfare 
services, such as Tennant, some clients present with backgrounds that involve anti-
social behaviour of an extreme kind.  This can create tension and stress for case 
workers as they align their professional work with their personal aversion for the 
individual’s prior behaviour (Clark, 2006). While professional training can prepare 
case workers for this challenge, many still find it difficult to manage clients who they 
perceive as insupportable (Balloch, Pahl & McLean, 1998).  Disagreements on these 
issues, both between case workers, and between case workers and supervisors, have 
potential to erode bonding.  It is not unusual for case workers to resign from their 
workplace due to an inability to resolve this stress.  Clark (2006) notes that resolution 
of this conflict cannot rely on the dictums of professionalism and suppression of 
individual feelings; rather, values need to be continually revisited and reaffirmed.   
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It is here that we observed the application of Tennant’s belief systems to provide 
a focus whereby troubled case workers could discuss and come to terms with 
Tennant’s aim to provide welfare to all individuals in need.  At Tennant there is much 
discussion about the ‘dignity of the individual’ including those with malevolent 
backgrounds, which is made explicit within belief systems.  Employing belief systems 
to work through the conflict between employee values and those of Tennant enhanced 
bonding.17  
Dominant belief systems appear to circumvent the need for boundary controls 
at Tennant. Carewell has developed a 40-point Code of Conduct which has to be 
signed off by all staff and volunteers upon entry to the organization.  However, this 
document does not appear to have high visibility within the organization, with some 
experienced co-ordinators claiming that they were not aware of its specific contents. 
Tennant’s manager indicated that the imposition of a code of ethics by the 
organization is not necessary because many employees are subject to professional 
codes of ethics. This type of professional control further ameliorated the role of 
Tennant’s boundary conditions. An experienced program co-ordinator echoed the 
comments of many employees in saying: 
“I have been working here for many years and yes, I am aware that there is 
a code of ethics but have never seen it.” 
 
Our observations suggest that it is bonding, supported by belief systems, that 
has helped Tennant to gain commitment and solidarity from its employees to work 
towards effective service provision. Although belief systems are important in 
developing bonding among Tennant employees, we also observed that the 
                                                 
17 Clark (2006) notes that this process is bound to be uncertain, shifting and hazardous. However, 
employing belief systems to assist in these processes does make case workers’ and the organization’s 
positions more intelligible, if not always completely comfortable. 
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development of such strong relationships can inhibit the bridging aspect of social 
capital by restricting and limiting engagement with partners and other service 
providers. As noted earlier, bridging external networks involving clients and other 
agencies is particularly important to Tennant.  
Despite the importance of collaboration, considerable tension existed within 
Tennant surrounding partnerships and the need to protect their values and operational 
methods. In response to the issue of how much of a priority it should be for Tennant 
to share values with partner organizations, a Tennant program coordinator noted: 
“It’s [sharing values with partner organizations] not, and I don’t know that it 
ever should be.  I actually don’t know that it should be – and I mean to use 
the word ‘should’, because I think it’s key for us to retain our own identity.”  
 
Although managers recognized that partnerships are critical, particularly in light 
of strong government pressure to form such alliances, maintaining Tennant’s identity 
and values within such partnerships was the overriding concern. A program co-
ordinator noted: 
“I’m very involved in one particular new partnership with some other 
partner agencies (other NGOs) and it’s quite clear to me that we run the risk 
in partnership of losing what we stand for, and what we’ve always done.  
We find ourselves in partnership almost having to apologize for the things 
that we need to hang on to and the things that define us and give us our 
identity. And it’s a really difficult position to be in, because you feel like 
you’re not necessarily bettering the prospects of the partnership but you’re 
standing up for what you represent within it, so it’s a conflict.”  
 
While belief systems are important in communicating and strengthening 
specific social justice values that help to develop and sustain bonding within Tennant, 
the strength of these systems and the resulting effects on internal solidarity is the very 
thing that appears likely to potentially limit the formation and development of strong 
alliances and partnerships with other key entities in the welfare sector.  However, as 
described below, belief systems, together with other formal controls, have a key role 
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in structuring external networks to ensure the preservation of the NGO’s cultural 
capital. 
 
The use of management control systems to broker alliances and sustain cultural capital  
An important aspect of Tennant’s efforts to attract economic capital is to 
develop alliances to apply for Government contracts. This is important given 
government’s active role in encouraging agencies in the sector to form such alliances 
to deliver programs.  Critical to this has been Tennant’s strategy to structure alliances 
in such a way as to enable Tennant to gain power and influence and thus maintain its 
cultural capital. That is, Tennant aims to develop alliances that allow its values and 
operational methods to play a prominent role, limiting potential clashes with the 
values and operational methods of other organizations.   
Manoeuvring within networks to achieve power and authority by brokering 
alliances requires the identification of potential partners, and then promotion to 
convince partners and Government of Tennant’s dominant capabilities and 
management skills. Identifying potential partners to ensure Tennant’s dominant 
position within the alliance involved scanning the environment to identify alliance 
partners with which Tennant has had prior favourable experience, but where the 
partners have had limited formal connections with each other. This has been described 
as a sparse network (Granovetter, 1983; Burt, 1992). Consequently, Tennant has the 
potential to derive significant power and influence through brokering relationships 
within structural holes (Burt, 2005), that is, by establishing connections between 
organizations not otherwise strongly connected.   
Tennant’s manager and a Carewell director both indicated that Tennant has 
been successful in using its reputation and connections with government to influence 
 39 
both government and other entities in the network, enabling it to broker relationships 
in ways that Tennant views as being most conducive to service provision.  Tennant’s 
manger illustrated this process: 
“We are stepping forward and asking to be the lead agency in each of the 
regions…That in part relies on a couple of things. One is the social capital 
we have within this organization to talk to other agencies about who we 
are, what it is we provide and why it would be reasonable to think of 
ourselves as a lead agency…We approach organizations that we think are 
going to be complementary and they’re usually around training and 
education and housing, the things we do …We have worked with all of 
them before. They haven’t necessarily worked with each other.” 
 
Concerning the use of MCS to assist brokering alliances we identified belief 
systems as important in clarifying and maintaining Tennant’s profile to external 
agencies. Further, formal controls based around project management, budgets and 
performance measurement were helpful in establishing perceptions of competence and 
demonstrating sound operational and financial performance to government.  These 
formal controls provided concrete evidence of Tennant’s effectiveness and financial 
viability. To ensure its dominant role in alliances, program management and budget 
systems were used to identify and articulate which partners would interact in ways 
that enabled Tennant to achieve its purposes. This would establish a network of 
agencies that might provide suitable services. Tennant’s manager indicated if these 
arrangements did not suit the partners, or partners presented a unified counter-
argument, the alliance would likely be terminated. In this situation we see a role for 
formal planning as a tactical contrivance to identify the density of social networks, 
and to find situations where Tennant could broker alliances (Burt, 2005).   
A manager described an experience that instigated this approach. Tennant had 
been involved with a major NGO that had strong connections within the network and 
Tennant had not been able to position itself as the lead agency. As such, Tennant was 
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not able to manage service providers to its advantage.  In this situation they felt they 
had been 'swallowed up' in the alliance and had lost their identity, which was a 
catalyst for the decision to broker alliance formation to exploit structural holes. 
Another benefit of Tennant’s ability to demonstrate good performance to 
government over time is that it has been able to access potentially important 
information on government intentions to restructure the sector. Here we see evidence 
of the dynamic nature of the field within which social capital is being applied, where 
the field is in flux as different entities struggle and manoeuvre to have influence 
(Bourdieu, 1993).  Through being able to access information on changing government 
intentions and priorities that other agencies cannot access, Tennant is able to act as a 
broker to develop collaborative proposals with other agencies for submission to 
government, further strengthening Tennant’s ability to define the network to its 
advantage (Burt, 1997, 2005).   
Evidence on the way Tennant acted as a broker between entities within 
structural holes builds our understanding of how power and authority over network 
partners can be developed. We observed how belief and other formal controls can 
help convince network partners that the focal organization should play a dominant 
role in the planned project.  The efficacy of these controls can be enhanced when 
potential network partners do not collaborate with each other.    
 
Conclusion  
In this paper we used the concept of social capital to advance understanding of 
the interplay between MCS and the development of social connections both within 
and between organisations.  By considering  the notions of economic and cultural 
capital, and bonding and bridging we have shown how social capital can enrich the 
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study of how MCS can assist, or hinder, NGO’s attempts to develop efficient and 
effective operations, within the context of the need to develop and manage economic 
resources while preserving their cultural capital.  Using social capital we can 
acknowledge the central role of developing social ties both within and between 
organizations.  By focusing on social capital, specifically the social ties involved in 
bonding and bridging, we can  better understand how individuals react to MCS, and 
the implications for the connection between MCS and both economic and cultural 
capital. Our case study of an NGO demonstrated how elements of a MCS can enhance 
and inhibit the bonding and bridging dimensions of social capital and how this is 
implicated in attempts to develop and manage economic resources while preserving 
cultural capital.  
This study has examined the dynamics of the interplay between MCS and 
social capital, and, in particular, revealed how different combinations of controls are 
related to different forms of social capital. We show that MCS can help to develop 
social capital; however, when different control system elements come into conflict, 
this can damage attempts to develop social capital. Our study shows how aspects of 
MCS (both organic controls and formal program management systems) can be used to 
enhance bridging and bonding social capital and help to preserve the cultural capital 
of an NGO. However, in our study, attempts to introduce formal controls, such as 
budgets, were not successful as they were predicated on acquiring and managing 
economic capital.  We noted that these systems were introduced in coercive ways 
where they did not enable employees to identify with the new competitive funding 
context.  In this situation, we observed instances where MCS inhibited bonding social 
capital which had the potential to diminish Tennant’s cultural capital. It was apparent 
that damage to cultural capital was contained, to a certain extent, because of the depth 
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of existing cultural capital derived from years of the employees’ commitment to 
Tennant’s core humanitarian values. However, the strength of bonding and the strong 
cultural capital inhibited efforts to develop an awareness and sensitivity to economic 
matters, which arguably are necessary for NGOs’ survival. 
Our study contributes to understanding the important and complex role of 
belief systems in the context of generating and sustaining bonding social capital 
within NGOs. We highlighted how belief systems can be used beyond merely 
communicating values to employees and outsiders, and form part of the process of 
managing and maintaining employees’ and outsiders’ identification with core 
organizational values. We show how belief systems can concurrently help to develop 
bonding around core values of the organization; yet such strong bonding leads to an 
inward focus and inhibited openness to developing bridging with other agencies.   
Our study also helps to develop understanding of the potential difficulties in 
employing financially-based MCS within NGOs. We saw widespread evidence, at the 
operational level, of resistance to using more formal financial controls as they were 
viewed as a threat to effective service delivery. Conversely, formal program 
management systems were well-received when employed to plan and monitor 
operations.  These controls appeared to map well onto the everyday work of 
employees and clarified objectives and monitored client treatments. In NGOs this is 
particularly salient as the proximity of controls to activities can have critical 
consequences for client welfare.  These formal program management systems were 
complemented with highly effective organic decision processes which were employed 
within loose structures and open communication networks. We see this approach of 
combining formal program management systems with informal controls working in 
tandem to facilitate internal bonding. Attempts to use financial controls interactively 
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were not successful as the financial logic implicit in such controls was perceived to be 
in opposition to core welfare ideals. While interactive use of financial controls had the 
potential to achieve productive debate on how welfare and economic values may be 
combined and reconciled, such debate was not forthcoming as the financial controls 
did not have enabling features.   
Given the inevitability of the application of financial controls in NGOs we 
suggest that their use would appear to require, as a precursor, a change in attitudes 
and values concerning financial responsibility and efficiency. It seems that financial 
responsibility could be encouraged by developing an efficiency focus before 
employing financial controls, and then using interactive controls to develop concern 
with financial matters. While this may seem to be common sense, it does highlight a 
potentially critical, but overlooked, role for belief systems in shaping values and 
attitudes towards other MCS elements, which focus on values that may be perceived 
by employees as conflicting. As a first step to developing a concern with financial 
matters, the formation and application of belief systems could emphasize the 
importance of generating both cultural capital (promoting core welfare values) and 
economic capital (with connotations of efficiency). Given acceptance of the need for 
financial management, MCS could be designed in ways to ensure that they are 
enabling and then be used in an interactive way to provide the forum for their on-
going application.  
 Our study provides some evidence related to the use of MCS by NGOs to 
enhance bridging. First, both belief systems and formal financial data had a role in 
legitimizing Tennant among alliance partners, funding agencies and government. 
This was part of Tennant’s struggle to maintain its identity and its cultural capital so 
as to attract the type of programs and funding that suited its welfare agenda. We 
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show how Tennant successfully employed controls to help develop bridging and 
broker arrangements between agencies. This was most effective when Tennant acted 
as a broker connecting agencies within structural holes (Burt, 2005).   
 This investigation is subject to several limitations. First, our focus is on the 
functioning and outcomes of a specific NGO, rather than on whether this NGO is 
more effective than others that operate in the sector. It is possible that the observed 
outcomes could have been delivered more effectively or efficiently by other NGOs. 
Within the scope of our study, we are not able to assess this. Second, while evidence 
was drawn from interviews, internal documents, public material and some external 
opinions, in the paper there was greater reliance on interview data.  While we viewed 
a wide array of archival documents, we were not able to reference these directly due 
to confidentiality.  Every attempt was made to gain information from a wide selection 
of individuals across the organization and to corroborate interview data with 
observation of archival data. While we made efforts to corroborate our  field data, we 
did not observe everyday operations in an intensive manner.  Consequently much of 
the data is based on a rather limited number of interviews as opposed to indepth 
observational data.  Third, while we were engaged with the organization for a period 
of 12 months and observed business over this time, some interviews were conducted 
during times that involved the introduction of changes that had a strong impact on the 
individuals. Their opinions may change over time. 
 Civil society is undergoing considerable change as the success of NGOs 
become increasingly dependent on their ability to develop strong reputations to gain 
government contracts and to receive funding from philanthropic organizations and 
other donors.  In the increasingly competitive environment, NGOs are being forced to 
demonstrate abilities to deliver services effectively and effectively, with the potential 
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for an increased focus on efficiency concerns to jeopardize the sustainability of their 
cultural capital. Consequently, it is necessary for NGOs to manage the potential 
conflict between generating social capital to sustain their cultural capital and employ 
practices consistent with the economics of welfare. The application of MCS has 
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 Administrative support 
 Strategic direction 
 Funding 
 Advocacy/Research 









 Other NGOs 
 Government departments 









Bridging and bonding dimensions of social capital and their potential benefits and disadvantages 
 






properties of the 
social system and 
the network of 
social relations as 
a whole.   
 Number of social ties within a network 
configured in terms of density, 
connectivity, hierarchy and 
appropriability (Adler & Kwon, 2002). 
 Extent to which individuals’ contact 
within networks are themselves 
connected. High (low) levels of 
interconnections indicate a closed 
(sparse) network (Coleman, 1988; Burt, 
1992). 
 Access to resources, information, and 
skills/knowledge (Boxman, De Graaf & 
Flap, 1991; Knoke, 1999; Coleman, 
1988; Burt, 1997; Powell & Smith-
Doerr, 1994; Podolny & Page, 1998)  
 Secure benefits (Portes, 1998) 
 Leadership, power and authority by 
brokering connections (Burt, 1992; 
Coleman, 1988) 
 Compliance with local rules and 
customs (Coleman, 1988)  
 Costly to maintain (Hansen, 1998) 
 Parochialism and inertia (Gargiulo & 
Bernassi, 1999, Powell & Smith-Doerr, 
1994, 393) 
 Group level exclusion and insularity 
(Foley & Edwards, 1996, 39) 
 Excessive brokering restricting network 
opportunities and innovation (Gabbay 
& Zuckerman, 1998) 
 Bringing together dissatisfied actors can 




The existence of 
values or norms 
shared by 
members of a 
group that permit 
cooperation among 
them. 
 Trust, cooperation and shared values 
(Putnam, 2000; Coleman, 1990; 
Fukuyama, 1995) 
 Generalized reciprocity (Putnam, 1995) 
 Cooperation between individuals 
(Fukuyama, 1997; Putnam, 1995) 
 Sharing of fine-grained information 
(Uzzi, 1997; Krackhardt & Hanson, 
1993)  
 Solidarity (Granovetter, 1983; Putnam, 
1993) 
 Faster dispute resolution and the 
prevention of sectarian grievances 
(Nelson, 1989) 
 Free rider problem and reduced 
incentives for entrepreneurial activity 
(Portes, 1998: Uzzi, 1997). 
 Promote parochial resistance in times of 
change and crisis (Krackhardt & Stern, 
1988) 
 Promote socially unacceptable values 
and attitudes (Brass, Butterfield & 
Skaggs, 1998; Gambetta, 1993)   
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Table 2: Taxonomies of MCS and importance to social capital 
 
Formal and informal MCS (Chenhall and Morris, 1995) 
Definition of dimensions  Focus of control Importance to bonding and bridging 
social capital  
Possible tensions 
Formal: deliberately 
articulated controls  that 
provide information related to 
resource planning, decision 
making, communication, and 
evaluation. 
Using quantitative information to focus 
attention on the capabilities of the NGO 
to deliver and manage in a business -like 
manner. 
 Enhance bridging by demonstrating 
capabilities and reputation to funding 
agencies, government and potential 
alliance partners. 
 Formal controls may clash where 
the organic processes have been the 
customary mode of control, with 
potential damage to bonding. 
Informal: organic 
communication and decision 
making processes. 
Open channels of communication, easy of 
access to senior managers, tolerance of 
mistakes, sharing of problems and 
solutions. 
 Enhance bonding by developing close 
interactions based on interpersonal 
connections. 
 
Levers of control (Simons, 1995)  
Definition of dimensions Focus of control Importance to bonding and bridging 
social capital  
Possible tensions 
Belief systems: the explicit set 
of organizational definitions 
that senior managers use to 
communicate and reinforce the 
values, purpose, and direction 
for the organization.  
Clarify, reinforce and communicate NGO 
values. 
 Enhance bonding by clarifying core 
values when selecting employees and 
reinforcing values between existing 
employees. 
 Enhance bridging by helping other 
parties within a network to understand 
the organization’s core values and 
purposes, particularly in times of 
change.  
 While belief systems promote and 
reinforce values, boundary systems 
may be perceived as unnecessary or 
even suggest that employees cannot 
be trusted, which could damage 
bonding.  
 Diagnostic controls provide 
information to manage in a more 
business-like way. This more 
bureaucratic approach may be 
incompatible with customary NGO 
controls and damage bonding. 
 While formal diagnostic-type 
controls may damage bonding they 
can enhance bridging by 
demonstrating NGO capabilities to 
Boundary systems: used by 
top managers to establish 
explicit limits and rules within 
which members can operate.  
Delineate the unacceptable domain of 
NGO activity.  
 Enhance bonding by clarifying 
unacceptable areas of activity. 
Diagnostic control systems: 
formal systems used to 
monitor organizational 
Used to describe NGO activities in formal 
plans and budgets .  
 Enhance bonding by clarifying goals 
and cascading expectations throughout 
the organization. 
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outcomes and correct 
deviations from preset 
standards of performance. 
 Enhance bridging by demonstrating 
capabilities to engage in network 
activities (Cooper & Slagmulder, 
2004), which may develop into 
relational signalling (Lindenberg, 
2000) and goodwill trust (Tomkins, 
2001). 
 Enhance bridging by identifying areas 
of joint interest thereby reinforcing 
parts of the network (Mouritsen & 
Thrane, 2006).  
funding bodies and alliance 
partners. 
 The formality of the interactive 
processes may be inconsistent with 
customary organic controls which 
may inhibit bonding.  
Interactive control systems: 
formal systems managers use 
to involve themselves 




Use of different formal control practices 
to focus attention and force dialogue 
throughout the NGO. 
 Enhance bonding by encouraging 
debate on values and future directions 
of the NGO. 
 Enhance bridging by helping managers 
to identify strategic uncertainties that 
may provide the impetus to create 
alliances and other cooperative 
arrangements thus extending networks.   
 
Forms of bureaucracy (Adler and Borys, 1996; Ahrens and Chapman, 2004)  
Definition of dimensions Focus of control Importance to bonding and bridging 
social capital  
Possible tensions 
Enabling: design and 
implementation of controls 
that are consistent with 
employees’ mental models of 
the work situation. 
Content  of controls: repair, internal 
transparency, global transparency and 
flexibility (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004). 
 
 Enhance bonding by encouraging 
identification with goals. 
 Potential to help resolve 
inconsistencies between customary 
organic processes and more 
bureaucratic approaches embedded 
in the interactive use of formal 
controls - a hybrid approach of 
enabling bureaucracy involving 
rules that are set, implemented and 
used organically. 
Coercive: use of 
predetermined explicit 
instruction, rigidity and 
authoritarian command and 
control to coerce compliance. 
As above.  Inhibit bonding as inconsistent with 
sharing of ideas and values that are 
central to the way that NGO’s operate. 
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1 Business Support Director - Carewell 60 
2 Program Manager, Tennant 120 
3 
 
Acting Program Director - Carewell & 
Program Manager, Options 90 
4 Program Manager - Opportunities 90 
5 Administrator - Tennant 90 
6 Program Manager - Tennant 120 
7 Accountant - Carewell 60 
8 Program Manager - Tennant 30 
9 Co-ordinator/case worker - Tennant 30 
10 Business Support Director - Carewell 90 
11 CEO - Carewell 90 
12 Co-ordinator/case worker - Tennant 75 
13 Co-ordinator - Tennant 80 
14 Co-ordinator - Tennant 60 
15 Co-ordinator/case worker - Tennant 60 
16 Program Manager - Tennant 75 
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Table 4: Relations between management control systems and social capital at Tennant  
 
Theme Specific practices Relations with social capital  
Informal and  formal MCS and 
bonding social capital 
 Organic decision and communication processes, 
such as informal regular meetings, open-door 
management policy, tolerance of mistakes, and 
sharing of information. 
 
• Open and supportive environment created by organic processes helped to 
develop and reinforce bonding. 
 
 • Program management system used interactively 
to plan and monitor client treatments in enabling 
ways. 
 
• Program management system developed bonding among case workers by 
helping them to assess progress on client treatments and clarify and 
communicate purpose. 
 
 • Budgeting system used interactively in staff 
discussions but in coercive ways. 
• Budgeting used to promote a focus on costs and efficiency and led to tensions 
around reactions to cost overruns and cost allocations, leading to a breakdown 
in bonding. 
Belief and boundary systems: 
bonding and bridging social 
capital 
• Extensive belief systems, such as formal mission 
statement, promotional leaflets, statues, 
photographs and paintings of patron, core values 
used to promote ideals internally and externally. 
Boundary systems, such as 40-point code of 
conduct signed-off by all employees and 
volunteers upon entry to the organization. 
Professional codes of ethics. 
• Belief systems developed a high degree of shared values among employees that 
generated strong bonding. 
•  Used to clarify and articulate values during recruitment to provide a basis for 
bonding.  
• Belief systems also helped employees manage the tension between personal and 
organizational values, further reinforcing bonding.  
• However, the strong bonding developed through belief systems subsequently 
limited bridging with other agencies. 
• Little effect of boundary systems on social capital as strong clarity of purpose 
makes boundary conditions unnecessary or at least redundant. 
MCS and brokering alliances  • Collection and reporting of financial data and 
KPIs to meet requirements of agreements with 
funders. 
• Belief systems, program management systems 
and budgeting system (as above). 
 Use of belief systems, and ‘concrete’ data from program management system, 
budgets and KPIs, to communicate and reinforced to external parties Tennant’s 
distinctiveness, reputation and prestige. This enabled Tennant to broker 
relationships within structural holes where its values and operational models 
could dominate. 
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